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Abstract
Advanced producer services have long been theorized as pivotal in organizing the global econ-
omy. Finance takes centre stage in the advanced producer services complex as orchestrator of
global flows, particularly in underwriting investment and evaluating corporate performance.
The ascent of financialized globalization raises the suspicion that key advanced producer services
act as rent-extracting ‘obligatory passage points’ in the orchestration of global financial flows.
Competition within the financial sector is contentious given the sustained profits by globally
connected banks operating in concentrated markets. Investment banks and other advanced pro-
ducer services play key roles in underwriting of securities, raising questions whether underwrit-
ing is a competitive process. This paper interrogates the microeconomic foundations for the role
of investment banks in investment chains to shed light on their rent extraction practices. Using a
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sample of 2940 initial public offerings for the USA, Canada, and Europe in the 1998–2017 period,
we examine the structure of fees charged by investment banks for underwriting of equity secu-
rities. Our results are consistent with the proposition that investment banks with more market
power and stronger network ties with institutional investors utilize their dominant position in the
marketplace to extract rents from both issuers and institutional investors. Taken together, at
times of spatial and sectoral consolidation, these results show compelling evidence for the status
of investment banks and by extension the wider advanced producer services complex as oblig-
atory passage points under financialized globalization.
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Introduction
Initial public offerings (IPOs), when companies list on a stock exchange and offer their
shares to the public, help companies raise funds, scale-up and often turn founders and large
investors into millionaires or even billionaires. Not all of them, however, are successful.
Take for instance the biggest US technology sector IPO since Facebook in 2012 when Uber
– the San Francisco headquartered ride-hailing company – went public on 10 May 2019.
$8bn was raised from investors, but at the end of the first trading day, the share price was
8% lower than the IPO price of $45 per share, making it one of the worst first-day perform-
ances for a large IPO in history. By contrast, most IPOs realize a positive return on the first
trading day, a phenomenon termed IPO underpricing (Liu and Ritter, 2011). While some
blamed adverse market conditions, US–China trade tensions and Uber’s creative account-
ing, it was clear that the company and its advisors misread the market. Still, despite the
disenchanting launch, Uber paid $106m in fees to a syndicate of investment banks (IBs) that
underwrote the IPO, led by Morgan Stanley, and most likely millions to accountancy (PwC)
and law firms (Cooley LLP and Covington & Burling LLP) involved (Shen, 2019).1
What justifies such high underwriting and other servicing fees despite abysmal perfor-
mance? Is the ability of IBs to charge high fees a sign that these fees represent more than the
service of making a company publicly tradable? If fees are charged irrespective of the IPO’s
‘success’, does this indicate that IBs are able to extract rents from counterparties in the
process? And what does it tell us about structural dominance of certain intermediaries in
financial and cognate services procured by what has been dubbed the advanced producer
services (APS) complex? Previous research indicates that competition in APS markets in
general and investment banking in particular might be limited (Christophers, 2018; Crotty,
2008). Following the 2007–2009 North Atlantic Financial Crisis, the scholarly consensus
among critical observers is that global IBs have grown too-big-to-fail and are instrumental
in producing recurrent crises (Tooze, 2018). Although investment banking activities have
shrunk and shifted geographically since the crisis, US banks continue to dominate despite
the rising importance of Asian capital markets (Wojcik et al., 2018b), as do Anglo-American
accountancy and law firms (Faulconbridge, 2019).
Bassens and Van Meeteren (2015) propose to theorize the APS complex as an obligatory
passage point under conditions of financialized globalization. Key in this notion is that the
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strategic positioning within financial networks (Van Meeteren and Bassens, 2016) enables
the APS complex as a fraction of capital to extract class-monopoly rents (Harvey, 1974)
from the wider economy. The APS complex, in general and tangibly in its local manifes-
tations in financial centres, is comprised of strong formal and informal interdependencies
within and between APS sectors, with finance acting as the crucial intermediary (Bassens
et al., 2020). However, the relation between these interdependencies and rent extraction
remains unexplored. Given IB’s current level of concentration, consolidation and their cru-
cial intermediary function in financialized globalization, it seems IBs are well placed to drive
rent extraction by the APS complex.
This paper examines whether the rent extraction characteristic of the APS complex can be
pinned down within the practices of IBs. As IBs are rather inaccessible to researchers, we
seek robust evidence of rent extraction by analysing observable outcomes of IB activity.
We analyse gross spread and IPO underpricing as potential rent extraction channels. Gross
spread is a direct fee charged for IPO underwriting services in a form of a percentage
discount on issuer’s IPO share price, when shares are sold by the issuer to an IB prior to
an IPO (Abrahamson et al., 2011). IPO underpricing is the difference between the end of the
first trading day market value of issuer’s equity securities sold in an IPO and the issue price
of such securities, effectively money left on the table and an indirect cost from the issuer’s
perspective (Liu and Ritter, 2011). The focus on IPOs is all but happenstance, since they
have been identified as instrumental in shifting risks and rewards among issuers, investors,
intermediaries, workers and the state (Lazonick and Mazzucato, 2013). Following such
readings of the risk-reward-nexus, one may even doubt the primary purpose of IPOs is to
attract capital or rather an instrument to extract value for shareholders in the wider econ-
omy and society (Mazzucato, 2018). We deploy econometric methods to test a set of hypoth-
eses originating in political-economic theory on a sample of 2940 IPOs in USA, Canada and
Europe in the 1998–2017 period from the Dealogic Equity Capital Market (ECM) database.
We estimate a series of linear regressions to determine whether market power and network
ties of underwriters with institutional investors are statistically significantly related to gross
spread and IPO underpricing, beyond what can be explained by IPO characteristics and
market environment. Statistically robust evidence of such relationships can be interpreted as
evidence consistent with the existence of IB rents.
Our findings show that IPO underpricing is the main channel for rent extraction.
Underpricing provides more quantitative potential than gross spread, but it is also statisti-
cally more robustly linked to the characteristics of IBs that we associate with the status of
APS as an obligatory passage point. These characteristics relate to oligopolistic market
competition supported by the market power and network ties of IBs with institutional
investors. Our results are consistent with the proposition that IBs with a more dominant
positioning in an oligopolistic marketplace can extract higher rents from issuers and invest-
ors. Crucially, IBs rely on other actors within the APS complex to both deliver IPOs and to
extract rents. Accounting and law firms are indispensable in co-producing IPOs, while IBs
need institutional investors in order to place IPO securities. As we show, IBs in fact rely on
cooperation with institutional investors to extract rents, thus corroborating the importance
of interdependencies within the APS complex. Had it not been for the cooperative mecha-
nism of rent extraction and rent sharing among IBs and institutional investors, value that is
currently captured by the APS complex would have been either retained by issuers’ pre-IPO
shareholders or passed onto individual investors following an IPO. Similar interdependen-
cies and rent sharing may also exist among IBs, accounting and law firms. Consequently, in
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order to understand the rent extraction by IBs, we need to consider their role within the APS
complex and their interactions with other key APS actors.
We proceed as follows. We first explain the structural importance of the APS complex
under financialization and the role of IBs therein, followed by formulating hypotheses
related to the specific mechanisms linking IB characteristics and fee structures in IPO under-
writing. The subsequent section describes our data and the methodological operationaliza-
tion of rent extraction. We then present findings from the econometric analysis, while the
discussion section relates our results to the existing literature on investment banking, APS
complexes and rent extraction. We conclude with the implications of this study for scholars
in financial geography and political economy more widely.
The APS complex and the extraction of class monopoly rents
Our central proposition is that a distinct class of APS intermediaries form a complex that is
in the position to extract rents from the wider economy. While the terminology of a ‘com-
plex’ has traditionally been used to denote ‘industry complexes’ around a central ‘propulsive
firm’, traditionally the oil refinery or steel mill, on which the other actors in the complex are
structurally dependent (Kramer, 1991), it is in the world and global cities literature (Bosman
and De Smidt, 1993; Sassen1991 [2001]) that the different APS sectors were first theorized as
a complex. These ‘complexes are characterized by sets of identifiable and stable relations
among firms which are in part manifested by their spatial behaviour’ (Gordon and McCann,
2000: 518). A complex is not reducible to its constituents, as no actor within the system has
‘all of the necessary information about technology, labour specialization, product innova-
tion and markets’ (Gordon and McCann, 2000: 519). That is, financiers, lawyers, account-
ants, consultants, together perform an economic function that is more than the sum of its
parts, like bringing an IPO into being (Pan et al., 2020). In a recent article, Bassens et al.
(2020) confirm the existence of the APS complex through an analysis of its internal relations
and note that it is particularly the ‘para-financial’ complex centred around finance, law and
accountancy that exhibits the characteristics of an intertwined cluster. Wojcik (2020) also
confirms that finance has increasingly been the ‘propulsive actor’ that determines the direc-
tion and strategy of the APS complex as a whole.
Key to our argument is that the club-like nature of the APS complex enables its members
to reap class monopoly rents (Harvey, 1974). Such a perspective hails back to political eco-
nomic readings of world and global cities that centre on the historical or contemporary
power of metropolitan fractions of capital (Arrighi, 2010 [1994]; Braudel, 1984; Kr€atke,
2014; Parnreiter, 2019). On an abstract level, the structural power of the APS complex
originates in its ability to connect production space with financial space at a time of over-
accumulation (Bassens and Van Meeteren, 2015). Connecting financial space with produc-
tion space is not by definition rent-seeking behaviour. The organizational service work of
the APS complex in bringing new ventures into being through capital pooling that would
not exist otherwise can be regarded as ‘productive’ (Walker, 1985). However, this changes
under conditions of overaccumulation or ‘the wall of money’ (Fernandez and Aalbers,
2016), which implies that there is more capital in the world than can realize itself, and
thus, there is a financial incentive for gatekeepers to leverage their power to give certain
capital fractions preferential treatment in accessing profitable capital circuits (Bassens and
Van Meeteren, 2015). It is hypothesized that the capacity of the APS complex to arbitrate
access to investment opportunities with the best risk-return profile is a source of ‘class
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monopoly rents’ where ‘the rate of return to a class of providers of a [. . .] resource [. . .] is set
by the outcome of conflict with a class of consumers of that resource’ (Harvey, 1974: 239).
This resource central to the APS-complex’s power is a bundle of intangible assets – ‘non-
financial assets that lack a physical substance, are nonrival in consumption and are at least
partially appropriable’ (Durand and Milberg, 2020: 404). It is only in the collaborative work
of the APS complex, their combined legal, organizational know-how and social networks,
that this bundle of intangible assets emerges and makes class-monopoly rents possible. Such
rents manifest themselves as the APS complex extracts a fee from the use of their collective
intangible assets, regardless of whether that knowledge ultimately results in profit for the
consumer of that knowledge. In the words of Christophers (2019: 315): ‘The specific prob-
lem of rent is not that it is unearned. It is that the rentier enjoys monopoly power in both the
control and marketization of [the rentier’s] asset’.
The concept of class monopoly rent provides a degree of theoretical closure, yet it also
puts the actual practices by the APS complex into a black box, effectively theorizing the
complex as a dominant (transnational) class fraction (Jessop, 1982), difficult to disentangle
empirically. The fact that APS collectively control an intellectual monopoly (Rikap, 2020)
that is able to distribute risks and rewards of capital does not mean they act as a concerted
monopolist. We hence need to open the black box at the micro-economic level to unpack the
internal hierarchy within the complex (Van Meeteren and Bassens, 2016) and to identify
which firms are in a power-position that allows rents to be appropriated.
This logic brings us to the IBs, which occupy the core of the APS complex (Wojcik, 2012,
2018). Investment banking covers a diversity of services including mergers and acquisitions,
IPOs, bond issuance and brokerage (Wojcik et al., 2018a). Some of the work of IBs is
infrastructurally important for the global financial system, yet there is also an incentive
to drive up their fee-based income to the detriment of their clients (Folkman et al., 2007).
Gatekeeping and gauging the access to any service or platform can be conceptualized as a
rent source, and access to IB services and networks is no exception (Sadowski, 2020).
If there is one actor in the APS complex that can control the spigot of surplus value obtained
by the APS complex by ‘manipulating expectations and contingent contracts’ (Foley, 2013:
264), it is the IB.
Our empirical focus is to examine the extent to which the character of IBs as obligatory
passage points in key markets correlates with the direct and indirect fees for their services.
High industry concentration and routine involvement of leading IBs in IPO underwriting
have already been identified as an environment conducive to corespective competition to
sustain high profits in seemingly competitive markets. ‘Corespective competition points to
an industry regime, in which large firms compete in many ways, but avoid the kinds of
competitive actions such as price wars, that significantly undercut industry profit’ (Crotty,
2008: 170). Corespective competition also suggests that IB markets are prone to network
externalities where a central position in the field becomes equivalent to a club good (Van
Meeteren et al., 2016: 67). The notion of club goods emphasizes that only a select number of
leading underwriters are central enough to have the capability to make their sub-network of
underwriters act in concerted fashion (Gemici and Lai, 2019). Empirical evidence shows that
securities underwriters benefit from their network centrality and grow faster than their
lesser-connected competitors (Pazitka and Wojcik, 2019). As the case of Uber introduced
above shows, the substance of these club goods is not always about enabling ‘productive’
investment, even though this is certainly possible. Rather, the ‘service’ offered by IBs is
granting issuers access to their concerted sub-networks of institutional investors, where the
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risk-reward combination is distributed in their favour, a power derived from the IBs’ ability
to place and deal securities through their networks. The implication of market power and
club access inequalities is that the monopolizing global networks of the most successful IBs
form the basis of their competitive advantage vis-à-vis lesser connected IBs. Such power
inequalities in turn play out in the uneven ability among IBs to act as crucial intermediaries
in investment chains – a theme we turn to in the next section.
IBs as an obligatory passage point in investment chains
Investment chains are composed of ‘the sets of intermediaries that “sit between” savers and
companies or governments, along with the links between those intermediaries’ (Arjalies et al.,
2017: 4). The investment chain concept elucidates how fees and investment returns are gen-
erated and distributed among IBs and institutional investors (Figure 1). Bookbuilding IPOs
Figure 1. Mechanisms of potential rent extraction in IPO underwriting.
Source: Authors’ visualization based on Nimalendran et al. (2007), Liu and Ritter (2010, 2011) and Arjalies
et al. (2017).
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have been historically the dominant mechanism for underwriting IPOs in the US and have
become common worldwide during the last 20 years (Abrahamson et al., 2011). What makes
bookbuilding IPOs distinctive from other mechanisms such as open auctions is that the book-
runner (the leading underwriter of the IPO) collects expressions of interest from institutional
investors during a marketing campaign, referred to as the roadshow, and the bookrunner then
allocates equity securities to investors on discretionary basis. This puts IBs in a power posi-
tion, as they have full discretion over the allocation of typically underpriced securities, which
are a source of investment returns for institutional investors (Liu and Ritter, 2011).
We identify two mechanisms of potential rent extraction in IPOs (Figure 1). First, IBs
earn fees in the form of a gross spread. This is a direct fee paid by the issuer as a percentage
of the value of underwritten securities and is agreed prior to the offering, along with the
price at which issuers’ securities will be sold to primary market investors. Gross spreads paid
by issuers are substantial, typically 7% for US IPOs, and highly clustered, indicating poten-
tial implicit collusion among underwriters (Abrahamson et al., 2011). While the jury is still
out on whether or how exactly underwriters collude to maintain gross spreads high, it
appears that gross spread would at least in principle allow for rent extraction by powerful
underwriters, who are able to leverage their strategic positioning in oligopolistic markets in
order to extract excess fees from issuers.
Second, IPO underpricing presents a much more intricate mechanism of potential rent
extraction and it allows actors other than IBs, including institutional investors and issuer’s
board members, to also extract rents. Concurrently, the ability of IBs to extract rents
through IPO underpricing relies on their collaboration with institutional investors and
issuer’s board members. Institutional investors may extract rents from issuers’ pre-IPO
shareholders by making their participation conditional on being able to buy securities in
IPOs at a price that is on average below their market price in the secondary market. To do
so, they however rely on IBs to price IPO securities accordingly. This persistent phenome-
non has been termed IPO underpricing and allows primary market investors to realize a
return on investment that oftentimes exceeds 10% during the first trading day following an
IPO (Liu and Ritter, 2011). Receiving allocations of securities in IPOs, which are on average
substantially underpriced, presents a very lucrative investment opportunity for institutional
investors, and as a result, bookbuilding IPOs are often heavily oversubscribed. Underwriters
have discretionary power over the allocation of securities in IPOs, and consequently, invest-
ors rely on their relationships with underwriters to receive allocations of securities in IPOs.
This opens up the IPO underpricing channel for rent extraction by IBs.
IBs underprice IPOs for a variety of reasons, including compensating investors for risk,
as well as to extract value from issuer’s pre-IPO shareholders and pass it onto institutional
investors (Liu and Ritter, 2011). In doing so, IBs reduce their own gross spread revenue
(Abrahamson et al., 2011). However, it has been documented that IBs are able to recoup
about 50% of IPO underpricing from primary market investors in the form of trading
revenue and analyst research fees (Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter, 2006). Recuperation
is typically achieved through tacit understanding among underwriters and institutional
investors that revenue generated for the underwriter through needless trading of liquid
stocks prior to an IPO will be rewarded with a proportional allocation of underpriced
securities. The rewards show that this fee income is a form of kickback for access to
highly profitable investment opportunities and it more than offsets the underwriters’ loss
of gross spread revenue, a direct consequence of IPO underpricing. Consequently, IBs
can extract rents from both issuers and institutional investors by underpricing IPOs.
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Institutional investors are net beneficiaries of this process, which incentivizes them to
participate. What ultimately allows IBs to extract rents in this manner is their
discretion over the pricing of IPOs and the allocation of securities to institutional investors2
(Liu and Ritter, 2011).
IBs may also share a fraction of the rents extracted with the issuer’s board members
through allocations of IPO securities or stock options. This kickback channel has
been primarily linked to securing client loyalty by underwriters (Liu and Ritter, 2010).
These observations allow us to formulate the following hypotheses on the relation between
gross spread, IPO underpricing and the market power of IBs.
H.1a IBs with more market power charge a higher gross spread.
H.1b IBs with more market power underprice IPOs more.
Rent extraction has been linked to oligopolistic positioning in the market for equity under-
writing services. Various proxies for market power of underwriters have been considered,
including market share, industry experience and provision of leading equity analyst research
(Liu and Ritter, 2011). The consideration of IBs’ network ties with institutional investors
seems like a natural extension to this list of dimensions of oligopolistic market competition
due to the crucial importance of underwriters as intermediaries between issuers and invest-
ors. However, IBs’ institutional investor networks have only recently been introduced in
research interrogating the APS complex (Gemici and Lai, 2019) and have not yet been
utilized to analyse rent extraction in IPOs. Despite the empirical difficulties of measuring
ties of IBs to institutional investors directly, the network centrality of IBs in syndication
networks3 can serve as proxy for those ties.
Existing empirical evidence on the relationship between network centrality of under-
writers and IPO underpricing contradicts the finance theory on information asymmetries
in markets. While finance theory suggests that information asymmetries and consequently
risk premia demanded by investors can be reduced by the presence of reputable and trusted
intermediaries (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Booth and Smith, 1986), network centrality of
underwriters has been found to raise, rather than lower, IPO underpricing (Bajo et al.,
2016; Chuluun, 2015). Existing explanations for this contradiction are still underdeveloped.
For Bajo et al. (2016), more central underwriters reduce their own compensation and trans-
fer additional value to investors to incentivize them to participate in IPOs. More intuitively,
one would expect that if anything, less-connected underwriters may have to pay a premium
for investors’ attention. In a related study, Chuluun (2015: 76) explains a positive partial
correlation between underpricing and reciprocity in underwriters’ peer networks by suggest-
ing that ‘[b]ook managers that maintain more reciprocal peer relationships tend to under-
price more, possibly to compensate its relationship partners’. The need to compensate
institutional investors more, when the lead underwriter is better connected, is not established
and neither is the underwriter’s motivation to do so. We propose that the relationship
between network centrality of underwriters and IPO pricing can be better explained through
the mechanism of rent extraction. We hypothesize that underwriters with stronger ties with
institutional investors are able to leverage their strategic positioning in investment chains to
extract rents through either gross spread or IPO underpricing channel.
H.2a IBs with stronger network ties with institutional investors charge a higher gross
spread.
H.2b IBs with stronger network ties with institutional investors underprice IPOs more.
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Research design
To construct our dataset, we start with all IPOs (34,447) underwritten between 1993 and
2017 available in Dealogic ECM database. This database has been previously used in studies
of IPOs (Abrahamson et al., 2011), network connectivity of financial services firms (Pazitka
and Wojcik, 2019) as well as financial centres and urban networks (Pazitka et al., 2019).
Despite the shortcomings of the database regarding the availability of geographical data and
its scope being limited to selected investment banking services, it provides a highly compre-
hensive record of IPOs and their characteristics. We then introduce restrictions to homog-
enize the sample, which have been used in related research (Abrahamson et al., 2011; Bajo
et al., 2016; Chuluun, 2015; Liu and Ritter, 2011). We limit our sample to issuers and stock
exchanges located in the USA, Canada and Europe (16,141 IPOs). We restrict ourselves to
bookbuilding IPOs (10,408), given that, unlike auctions or other IPO mechanisms, they give
underwriters full discretion over the allocation of shares to investors and consequently allow
for rent extraction. We exclude closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts, American
depository receipts, convertibles, global depositary receipts and unit trusts. We also exclude
IPOs of financial companies (four-digit SIC starting with 6), deals without an offer price
available in Dealogic ECM database, and IPOs that have been withdrawn. For the 1993–
2017 period, these selections leave a sample of 8,388 IPOs. We use this dataset to construct
our explanatory variables that rely on lagged observations, including network centrality and
market share. For our econometric estimation, we use IPOs for the 1998–2017 period, for
which data on gross spread or underpricing, as well on all explanatory variables, is available.
This gives us 2,940 IPOs with all the necessary data available to model gross spread and
2,831 to model IPO underpricing including 2,171 US IPOs, 113 from Canada and 656 from
Europe.
To operationalize our model of rent extraction (Figure 1), we use gross spread and IPO
underpricing as dependent variables. Neither gross spread nor underpricing can be equated
to rents, as there are numerous factors that influence gross spread and underpricing, includ-
ing expenses incurred by underwriters and risk premia required by both underwriters and
investors. Underwriters’ expenses in our sample range from 2.5% to 25% of gross fees,4
hence most variation in IPO costs is due to risk premia and rent extraction. Unfortunately,
neither risk premia nor rents can be isolated as easily as underwriting expenses. We can,
however, disentangle the variation in gross spread and IPO underpricing by modelling gross
spread and underpricing as a function of their known determinants that control for the
variation related to the risks and costs associated with offerings and the market environ-
ment. We propose that the variation in the pricing of IPOs associated with market power
and network ties with institutional investors is symptomatic of rent-seeking behaviour.
Evidence of rents derived from individual transactions can then be also interpreted as evi-
dence of rents at the systemic level, given that class monopoly rents are in effect an aggregate
of rents earned from individual IPOs.
We employ three distinct proxies to measure the market power of underwriters. First,
market share is used as a measure of positioning of IBs in what Liu and Ritter (2011)
characterize as an oligopolistic market structure for underwriting services. Second, we
employ an industry experience variable, operationalized as the number of IPOs in a given
industry, underwritten by the IPO’s lead underwriter. Finally, we include an issuer-specific
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), utilizing Liu and Ritter’s (2011) specification.
This index builds on the notion of oligopolistic competition in IPO underwriting markets
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and controls for the concentration within a subset of underwriters, which are identified as
relevant competitors to the lead underwriter.
We operationalize our measures of network ties with institutional investors by measuring
various network centrality indicators of underwriters in syndication networks, which are
formed through consecutive rounds of underwriting syndicates. We utilize degree centrality,
two-step reach centrality, Burt’s (2004) network constraint, Freeman’s (1979) betweenness
and Bonacich (1972) eigenvector centrality, defined in Table 1. Although an indirect mea-
sure, network centrality of underwriters is closely related to network ties with institutional
investors. The specification of our network centrality variables is based on the observation
that underwriting syndicate members are selected purposefully to broaden the pool of insti-
tutional investors involved in an offering. Hence, we assume that underwriters that have
been involved in syndicates with a wider pool of their peers will on average be able to
facilitate access to a wider pool of institutional investors for issuers (Pollock et al., 2004).
To isolate the effects of market power and network centrality of underwriters, we control for
a wide range of IPO characteristics and market environment variables identified by previous
studies (Abrahamson et al., 2011; Bajo et al., 2016; Chuluun, 2015; Liu and Ritter, 2011).
Table 1 defines these variables, presents their descriptive statistics and data sources.
GrossSpreadi ¼ NetCenib1 þMktShareib2 þ IndExperib3 þ IssuerSpecHHIib4 þ
Xk
5
Ck;ibk þ ei (1)
Underpricingi ¼ NetCenib1 þMktShareib2 þ IndExperib3 þ IssuerSpecHHIib4 þ
Xk
5
Ck;ibk þ ei (2)
Equation (1) represents an econometric model of gross spread as a function of network
centrality (NetCen), market share of the lead underwriter over the last five years
(MktShare), industry experience of the lead underwriter (IndExper), issuer-specific HHI
(IssuerSpecHHI) and a vector of control variables (C). Equation (2) includes the same
four variables of primary theoretical interest as well as a different set of control variables
linked to underpricing in the related research (C*). Both equations are estimated using an
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator and heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors to
calculate t-statistics. The correlation between market share and degree centrality is 0.76
across our sample of IBs. This reassures us that not only both explanatory factors are
suitable proxies for positioning of IBs in an oligopolistic market structure but that they
may also be subject to statistical conflation. To address this, we follow Bajo et al. (2016) and
use the residuals from a linear regression of market share on all network centrality variables
instead of the raw market share, thus effectively orthogonalizing these variables.
Results
We begin with examining the empirical distributions of gross spread and IPO underpricing
to better understand their use as channels for rent extraction. The mean of these distribu-
tions reveals the fraction of deal value that is typically transferred from issuer to third
parties, while the variance gives us an indication of the differences in value extraction
across IPOs. Perhaps, the most striking observation here is that while the units of
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measurement are comparable for the two measures (both are reported as fractions of the
offering size), IPO underpricing varies within a significantly wider range than gross spread.
Across the entire sample, the standard deviation of underpricing is 55.44%, in contrast to
1.64% for gross spread. Additionally, average underpricing (26.30%) is also much higher
than average gross spread (6.10%). This suggests that underpricing accounts for most of the
variation in the value transferred from issuers to investors and IBs during IPOs. Although
first trading day returns vary widely, IPOs are typically underpriced (for 74.1% of IPOs)
rather than overpriced. This implies that underpricing of IPOs is intentionally engineered by
underwriters, rather than a random outcome associated with trading in secondary markets.
The distributions of both market shares and network centralities indicate that a small
number of the largest and most connected IBs dominate IPO underwriting markets. The five
banks with the highest market share in 2017 – Morgan Stanley (6.76%), JPMorgan (6.09%),
Citi (5.25%), Goldman Sachs (4.64%) and Credit Suisse (3.80%) also dominate investment
banking networks and are connected to 76.5% (Morgan Stanley), 75.6% (JPMorgan),
68.0% (Citi), 72.5% (Goldman Sachs) and 75.8% (Credit Suisse) of IBs. We now proceed
to review our hypotheses in the light of evidence obtained from the econometric analysis.
H.1a IBs with more market power charge a higher gross spread.
Underwriters with larger market share in the IPO underwriting market charge higher direct
fees, an estimated premium of 0.11 to 0.12 percentage points for a 10% increase in under-
writer’s market share (Table 2). To illustrate this premium in monetary terms, we multiply
the average IPO size in our sample ($217m) by our estimated percentage changes. This
yields a premium of $239k–$260k in gross spread for an average IPO. Similarly, issuers
facing a more concentrated market for underwriting services pay an estimated premium of
0.02 percentage point ($44k for an average IPO) for every 10% increase in HHI. Our
estimates of the effect of industry experience have a somewhat counterintuitive negative
sign, although the magnitude of the estimated coefficient suggests an effective zero effect on
gross spread. Taken together, although we find some evidence of statistically significant
relationships between market power of underwriters and gross spread, the economic signif-
icance of these relationships appears modest.
H.1b IBs with more market power underprice IPOs more.
For a 10% increase in underwriter’s market share, IPO underpricing increases by 4.3 to 4.8
percentage points on average ($9.3m–$10.4m for an average IPO; Table 3). Coefficient
estimates on the industry experience variable corroborate the above result and imply that
underwriters with more industry experience underprice more, ceteris paribus, a result con-
sistent with hypothesis H.1b. The magnitude of these estimates suggests that for additional
10 IPOs underwritten in the same Fama-French (1997) industry,5 an IPO is expected to be
underpriced by additional 0.2 percentage points ($434k for an average IPO). Our alternative
specification of market power – issuer-specific HHI – also yields consistently positive esti-
mates, although the precision of these estimates is too low to establish statistical
significance.
H.2a IBs with stronger network ties with institutional investors charge a higher gross spread.
We estimate that for a 10% increase in the number of ties formed by underwriters in the
three years preceding an IPO (degree centrality), they would charge on average 0.04 per-
centage points lower gross spread ($87k for an average IPO). This pattern is broadly
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repeated across our results on eigenvector centrality (0.05 percentage points decrease in
gross spread per 10% increase in eigenvector centrality), two-step reach centrality (0.01)
and betweenness (0.28). Our coefficient estimate on Burt’s (2004) network constraint has a
positive sign, in contrast to the negative coefficient estimates on all other network centrality
variables. This is not a contradiction, however, given that Burt’s (2004) network constraint
decreases, as underwriters either form more ties or the redundancy of ties among their
syndication partners decreases – implying that a said underwriter has improved its position
as a broker connecting others. Consequently, an opposite sign is expected from a coefficient
estimate on network constraint in comparison to the remainder of our network centrality
variables. The coefficient estimate on network constraint implies that a 10% reduction in
network constraint leads to a 0.07 percentage point decrease in gross spread ($152k for an
average IPO). It therefore appears that, if anything, well-connected underwriters charge on
average lower gross spread as a competitive advantage to secure new business rather than to
extract rents from issuers. This contradicts our hypothesis, but to fully appreciate these
results, we need to consider them in conjunction with those linking network centrality to
underpricing.
H.2b IBs with stronger network ties with institutional investors underprice IPOs more.
The coefficient estimate on degree centrality implies that for a 10% increase in the
number of unique network ties of an underwriter, underpricing increases on average by
0.95 percentage points ($2.1m for an average IPO; Table 3). The coefficient estimate on two-
step reach centrality implies a much smaller economic effect of network centrality, a mere
0.10 percentage points ($217k for an average IPO) increase in underpricing for a 10%
increase in two-step reach centrality. In our view, this points to the lesser importance of
indirect ties. The coefficient estimate on eigenvector centrality translates into a 0.99 per-
centage point ($2.1m) increase in underpricing for a 10% increase in underwriter’s eigen-
vector centrality. Our results on Burt’s (2004) network constraint and betweenness however
underline the role of the wider network structure. Burt’s (2004) network constraint is esti-
mated to increase underpricing by 1.21 percentage points ($2.6m) for a 10% reduction in
network constraint, implying lower redundancy in underwriter’s subnetworks and a larger
number of direct ties. This result suggests that underwriters who benefit from being in a
position of connecting many otherwise disconnected actors in their networks underprice
more. This is corroborated by our results on betweenness, a simpler measure of brokerage
opportunities, which suggests a 3.83 percentage point ($8.3m) increase in underpricing for a
10% increase in network centrality.
Discussion
How to interpret these statistical relationships between market power, network centrality,
gross spread and IPO underpricing? Finance theory suggests that pricing of IPOs is pro-
portional to the information asymmetries between issuers and investors, while IBs charge
fees commensurate with the risks and costs that they assume (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Booth
and Smith, 1986). IBs charge a percentage fee derived from the value of the underwritten
securities, termed gross spread, intended to cover the underwriters’ costs, compensate for the
risks of the offering, and allow underwriters to earn profit. Gross spread is agreed in
advance of the offering along with the price for which the underwriter sells securities to
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investors. The issuer receives the price that investors pay for securities, reduced by the value
of the gross spread, which is kept by underwriters. Additionally, finance theory explains that
underwriters typically aim to set the offering price below the expected market value to
incentivize investors to buy securities in IPOs, compensate them for the risk of buying
securities for which a market price has not yet been established, and to minimize the
chance of shareholder lawsuits following the offering (Liu and Ritter, 2011). The persistent
effort of underwriters to underprice IPOs below their expected market value is then again a
reflection of the inherent risk in the offering. In sum, from the perspective of financial
economics, both gross spread and IPO underpricing play an important role in pricing
IPOs and serve as mechanisms of pricing risk associated with IPOs, as well as compensating
underwriters and investors (Abrahamson et al., 2011; Bajo et al., 2016).
However, from a political-economy perspective, the observable characteristics of IPOs
related to risks, costs and market environment offer only a partial explanation for the fees
charged. This observation lends credence to a view that factors in a rent component into the
income stream mix of IBs, or, in the terminology of Lazonick and Mazzucato (2013) that
IBs are in the position to extract value for themselves and their clients. The results indeed
show that IBs with higher market power and stronger network ties with institutional invest-
ors charge fees beyond what could be justified by the observable characteristics of the IPOs
they underwrite.
Analysing the degree to which gross spreads and underpricing augment excess profits, we
observe that the former is marginal as direct price competition between IBs is close to
irrelevant. Gross spreads, which represent a cost/risk covering fee, show little variance
and are highly clustered at country level. However, when we turn to IPO underpricing,
the picture changes completely. The more powerful and better connected IBs on average
underprice IPOs more and pocket indirect fees through kickbacks of trading revenue and
equity research fees earned from institutional investors. The marginal losses on their
gross spreads are compensated manifold by the extra fees gained through such kickbacks.
This key finding underlines the relational character of IB networks, suggesting that much of
the turnover depends on the exploitation of established relations with issuers, institutional
investors and partner IBs.
What emerges from the above is the picture of a close-knit network of central IBs
performing a crucial intermediary function in investment chains. In fact, within the larger
population of IBs, a subset of powerful and globally connected IBs manages to systemat-
ically charge excess fees that cannot be explained by the characteristics of IPOs they under-
write. While a further dissection of the nature of these rents falls beyond the scope of this
paper, we find statistically robust evidence that market concentration and industry consol-
idation enable IBs to extract higher fees compared to less powerful and less connected
competitors. Both instances of structural power are instrumental for the business model of
leading IBs and both limit competition in practice to the extent that the functioning of
market dynamics is stymied (Crouch, 2011), in turn enabling rent extraction through core-
spective behaviour (Crotty, 2008).
The outcomes are telling. Regarding industry consolidation, the top five IBs in the US
have increased their asset share from 50% to over 65% over the 2001–2007 period (Crotty,
2008), while top 10 banks control 68%, 56% and 50% of assets, loans and deposits, respec-
tively (Christophers, 2018). In the European Union, consolidation is evident with the top
five largest credit institutions seeing asset shares increasing from around 42–46% in the
2005–2015 period (European Central Bank, 2017: 30). Oligopolistic market concentration, in
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turn, supports the too-big-to-fail status of the intermediaries concerned and their potential
to extract rents from the wider economy (Christophers, 2018). This is exactly what Wojcik
et al. (2018b) find: in 2015, the top 10 banks had a 50% share in IB fees across four core
service categories.66 A salient feature of investment banking more widely is its spatial con-
centration in the apex nodes of the world city network (Wojcik et al., 2018a). The top 10
world cities provide 80% of the investment banking business (Wojcik et al., 2019). The
geographies of investment banking, in other words, show a continued propensity for rela-
tional proximity of a limited number of powerful and well-connected actors, on which the
periphery of the financial system is dependent (Van Meeteren and Bassens, 2016, 2018).
Conclusions
While piecemeal evidence for the rent-extracting character of IBs was in place (Christophers,
2018; Crotty, 2008), large swaths of this terrain have remained uncharted. To start broach-
ing the thorny question of rent, this paper has provided empirical evidence that rent is
accruing in IBs. We have empirically investigated two main channels through which IBs
could potentially extract rent, namely gross spread and IPO underpricing, and examined
their modus operandi. First, underwriters might charge higher gross spread than would be
justified by the characteristics and risks of IPOs they underwrite. Second, they can under-
price issuers’ securities excessively and thus reduce the amount of money received by the
issuer in proportion to the market value of the securities issued. Investors can also be a
target of rent extraction by underwriters when the allocation of underpriced securities in
IPOs becomes conditional on the fee income that institutional investors generate for the
underwriter prior to the offering. Consequently, powerful underwriters can leverage their
strategic position of intermediaries between issuers and investors to extract rents from both
sides of the market.
Our findings are subject to several limitations. First, we restrict ourselves to rent extrac-
tion in the underwriting of bookbuilding IPOs as our empirical context. Although we indi-
cate how IB activity is reliant on services provided by the wider APS-complex, we cannot
probe the share of the class-monopoly rent appropriated by other actors, such as accounting
and law firms. This is in part due to the limitations of the data on IPO pricing available to
us, which we source from the Dealogic ECM database. Second, our study covers a limited
geographical area – USA, Canada and Europe – and is restricted to the 1998–2017 period.
Third, although our reasoning and conceptualization of rent extraction through the under-
pricing channel relies on the existence of revenue kickbacks from institutional investors, we
refer to published studies to corroborate this mechanism (Nimalendran et al., 2007; Reuter,
2006). Finally, rent extraction in the proposed form relies on the discretion of underwriters
over the allocation of IPO securities to institutional investors, a phenomenon specific to
bookbuilding IPOs. These limitations, however, do not undermine the wider significance of
our results, given that bookbuilding IPOs are the dominant form of going public, consti-
tuting 64.5% of all IPOs for our sample period and countries studied. With these limitations
in mind, we would like future research to consider rent extraction across different contexts
and sub-sectors of the APS complex as well as across a more diverse group of countries and
alternative time periods. It would also be invaluable, if alternative analytical methods for
studying rent extraction are developed, to support future empirical research.
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Despite these caveats, and considering that IBs act as an ‘indicator species’ (Rossi et al.,
2007: 630) within the APS complex as a whole, our findings substantiate the argument that
the APS complex functions as an obligatory passage point enabling rent extraction from the
wider economy. As such, we also find support for the augmented world city hypothesis, which
claims that APS are obligatory passage points for accumulation in times of financialized
globalization (Bassens and Van Meeteren, 2015). Given that IBs serve as anchoring organ-
izations in the APS complex, it follows that capabilities to extract rents also apply to cog-
nate APS. Either directly as remuneration of legal, accountancy and consulting firms in the
underwriting process or indirectly, as dominance in underwriting will carry over into other
business supported by the wider APS complex. Such an assumption chimes with what
Taylor (2000) calls a propensity of APS more widely to mine monopolies of regionalization:
‘In services such as finance, accountancy and corporate law, practitioners are not just ser-
vicing “global capital,” they are creating new products based upon their unique knowledge
collectivities. In other words, they do not aim to operate in a price-setting market, but rather
develop multiple monopolies of quality knowledge products to reap appropriately large
profits’ (Taylor, 2000: 10). Given the long path dependent trajectory in which IBs and the
necessary metropolitan endowments that facilitate IBs emerge (Wojcik et al., 2018a), the
micro-level practices of rent extraction hinge on place-based and networked externalities
currently available to the few. As too-big-to-fail banks remain in place, such micro-
practices, despite changes in the hierarchies of financial institutions and centres, are likely
to reproduce the very role of world cities as obligatory passage points for financialized
globalization.
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Notes
1. While information on the fees paid by Uber to accountancy and law firms are not publicly avail-
able, we expect them to be in the range of 2 to 15 million US Dollars, based on data and examples
from Sullivan (2014) and FRC (2019).
2. This holds for bookbuilding IPOs, but is not the case for other IPO mechanisms, such as auctions.
3. Networks formed by co-membership of IBs in underwriting syndicates.
4. This is based on the data on underwriting expenses for individual IPOs available in Dealogic ECM
database.
5. Fama and French (1997) consolidate standard industrial classification (SIC) codes into 48 indus-
trial categories, leading to a more manageable set of industrial categories widely applied in research
on IPOs (Liu and Ritter, 2011).
6. Underwriting of equity and debt securities, syndicated loans and advisory services in mergers and
acquisitions.
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